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In 1977, the Illinois Legislature passed the Illinois Business
Takeover Act.' The Act was one of many state statutes 2 which regu-

*I would like to dedicate this note to my parents, Mr. and Mrs. Louis Meland, for their
constant encouragement and support.
1. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, para. 137.51 to .70 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987).
2. Thirty-six states regulated tender offers. The statutes were: ALASKA STAT. §§ 45.57.010
to .120 (1986); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 67-1264 to -1264.14 (1980); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 11-51-101
to -129 (1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-457 to -468 (West 1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8, § 203 (1983); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 517.35-.363 (West 1977) (repealed 1979); GA. CODE ANN.
§§ 22-1901 to -1915 (1977 & Supp. 1982); HAw. REV. STAT. §§ 417E-1 to E-11 (1985); IDAHO
CODE §§ 30-1501 to -1514 (1986); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, para. 137.51-.70 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1983-84) (repealed by Act No. 83-365, 1983 Ill. Legis. Serv. 2628 (West)); IND. CODE
209
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lated attempts to gain corporate control by means of a cash tender
offerA In 1982, the United States Supreme Court in Edgar v. MITE
Corp., held the Illinois Business Takeover Act unconstitutional. 4 The
decision effectively extinguished the first generation of state takeover

statutes, 5 but did not prohibit all state efforts in regulating tender
offers.6
In the five years since MITE, more than twenty-nine states7 have
passed a second generation of takeover statutes. State legislatures
did not simply amend their original takeover statutes, but carefully
drafted new statutes to comport with the MITE decision.8 Increas-

ANN. §§ 23-2-3.1-0.5 to -11 (Burns 1984); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 502.211-.215 (West 1987); KAN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 17-1276 to -1285 (1981); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 292.560-.991 (Baldwin 1986);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:1500 to :1512 (West 1987) (repealed 1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 13, § 801-817 (Supp. 1983-1985) (repealed 1985); MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. §§
11-901 to -908 (1985); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 110C, §§ 1 to 13 (Law. Co-op. 1985); MICH. COmp.
LAWS ANN. §§ 451.901-.917 (West 1987); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 80B.01-.13 (West 1986); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 75-72-101 to -121 (1987); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 409.500-.565 (Vernon Supp. 1986-87);
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 21-2401 to -2417 (1983); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 78.376-.378 (1981); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 421-A:1 to :15 (Supp. 1987) (amended 1983, 1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§

49:5-1 to -19 (West Supp. 1987); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 1600-1613 (McKinney 1986); N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 78B-1 to -11 (1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.041 (Page 1985); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 70, §§ 71-85 (Purdon Supp. 1987); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 35-2-10 to -2-130 (Law. Co-op.
1987); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 47-32-1 to -48 (1983); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-5-101 to
-114 (1984); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 61-4-1 to -13 (1978) (repealed 1983); VA. CODE ANN. §§
131-528 to -540 (1985) (amended 1983); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 552.01-.25 (West special pamphlet
1987).
3. Congress failed to define 'tender offer" in drafting the Williams Act. However, definitions
have evolved. Generally, a tender offer is a publicly made invitation to all shareholders of a
corporation to tender their shares for sale at a specified price. Note, The Developing Meaning
of "Tender Offer" Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1250, 1251
(1973). See E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 70

(1973) (tender offer is a public offer or solicitation by a company, an individual, or a group of
persons to purchase during a fixed period of time all or a portion of a class or classes of securities
of a publicly held corporation at a specified price or upon specified terms for cash and for
securities); Mather, The Elusive Definitionof a Tender Offer, 7 J. CORP. L. 503 (1982) (discussing
the evolution of the definition of the term "tender offer"). See also Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 16,384, 3 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 24,281A (Nov. 29, 1979) (SEC proposed a
two-tier definition of tender offer).
4. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
5. After MITE, the Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits applied the Supreme Court's
reasoning to strike down state takeover statutes. See infranotes 117-21 and accompanying text.
6. MITE, 457 U.S. at 646 (Powell, J., concurring in part) (the majority opinion "leaves
some room [open] for state regulation of tender offers").
7. For a list of states, see infra notes 127 & 148.
8. See Note, Second GenerationState Takeover Legislation: Maryland Takes a New Tack,
83 MICH. L. REV. 433, 434 (1984).
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ingly, the constitutionality of the second generation of state takeover
statutes was questioned. 9 In Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS
Corp.,10 the Seventh Circuit United States Court of Appeals found
Indiana's takeover statute unconstitutional. The court found the Indiana Control-Share Acquisition statute violated the supremacy" and
commerce clauses.12 The United States Supreme Court granted certioraris and unexpectedly reversed the decision.
The Supreme Court's decision in CTS 4 represents a shift in the
Court's view of state takeover statutes. In CTS, the Court upheld an

Indiana statute that restricted offerors' ability to gain control of target
corporations.' 5 The Court ruled that a state may regulate takeovers
of corporations that are both chartered by the state and have substantial assets in the state. 16 Since the CTS decision, ten states,'7 including
Florida and Delaware, 8 have enacted or modified laws designed to
thwart hostile takeovers of in-state companies. More states are likely

to follow suit.
This note examines the first generation state takeover statutes
and their subsequent demise in light of Edgar v. MITE Corp. The
note then examines the emergence of second generation state takeover

9. See, e.g., Fleet Aerospace Corp. v. Holderman, 796 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1986), vacated,
107 S. Ct. 1949 (1987) (vacated and remanded in consideration of the Dynamics decision);
Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 107 S. Ct. 1637
(1987); Cardiff Acquisitions, Inc. v. Hatch, 751 F.2d 917 (8th Cir. 1984); Terry v. Yamashita,
643 F. Supp. 161 (D. Haw. 1986); APL v. Van Dugen Air, Inc., 622 F. Supp. 1216 (D. Minn.
1985); Icalm v. Blunt, 612 F. Supp. 1400 (D. Mo. 1985).
10. 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987).
11. For a discussion of the supremacy clause, see infra notes 164-70 and accompanying text.
12. For a discussion of the commerce clause, see infranotes 171-76 and accompanying text.
13. CTS, 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987).
14. Id. (Justice Powell delivered the Court's opinion, in which Justices Rehnquist, Brennan,
Marshall, & O'Connor joined, and in Parts I, III-A, & III-B of which Justice Scalia joined.
Justice Scalia filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in judgment. Justice White
filed a dissenting opinion, in Part II of which Justices Blackmun and Stevens joined.).
15. Id. at 1652.
16. Id. at 1649.
17. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-1201 to -1223 (Supp. 1987); DEL. CODE ANN. § 203
(1988); FLA. STAT. §§ 607.108-.111 (1987) LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12:135 to 12:140.2 (Supp.
1988); Commonwealth of Massachusetts H.B. 5869, to be codified as MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 272, ch. 1100; MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 302.A.601 to .673 (West Supp. 1988); State of Missouri
H.B. 349, to be codified at Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 351.015, .295, .407, .410-.459 & .690; State of
Nevada Assembly Bill 748, to be codified in NEV. REV. STAT. ch. 78.376 et. seq.; N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 55-90 to 98.1 (Supp. 1987); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 23A.50.010 to 23A.50.901 (Supp.

1988).
18. For a brief discussion of Delaware's statute, see Veasey, DelawareAdopts New Takeover
Statute, Bus. LAW. UPDATE, Jan./Feb. 1988, at 1.
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legislation, which purportedly complies with MITE. Control share
acquisition statutes and fair price statutes, both of which Florida
adopted, are discussed. Finally, this note analyzes the constitutionality
of these second generation state takeover statutes in light of CTS
Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America.
I.
A.

HISTORY

Tender Offers

Cash tender offers are proposals by an acquiror to purchase target
company shares at a premium above the current market price. 19 The
acquiror seeks to gain control of the target company by purchasing a
minimum number of shares.2 0 The acquiror's obligation to purchase
tendered shares is typically conditioned on the tender of enough shares
to gain control.2 1 The offer establishes the time period during which
shareholders can tender their shares.Y If shareholders do not tender
the minimum number during this period, the acquiror may extend the
tender offer time, increase the premium, or make a new offer at a
m Most offers allow the
higher price after the initial offer has expired.2
acquiror to terminate the offer if a specified condition occurs before
the acquiror pays the target shareholders.2
Tender offers force target shareholders to make difficult investment
decisions.25 Shareholders generally have three options. First,
shareholders may tender their shares to the acquiror.26 If the offer
fails, shareholders retain their stock, which usually falls quickly in

19. See, e.g., Note, Cash Tender Offers, 83 1hARV. L. REv. 377, 377-78 (1969). Bargaining
positions between acquiror and target, market conditions, the stocks' recent price history, and
dispersion of ownership will all affect the premium rate. Johnson, Disclosure in Tender Offer
Transactions:The Dice are Still Loaded, 42 U. Prrr. L. REV. 1, 4 (1980).
20. Note, supra note 19, at 378-79. Gaining control through a cash tender offer is generally
cheaper than purchasing the assets. Purchasing assets is more expensive because the purchaser
"must in effect buy all of the outstanding voting stock of the target corporation." Id. at 378.
In a tender offer a purchaser needs to buy at most half of the target's outstanding shares to
gain control. Id.
21. The minimum number of shares is usually the amount that will give the offeror control
of the target. See Fleischer & Mundheim, CorporateAcquisition by Tender Offer, 115 U. PA.
L. REV. 317, 328 (1967).
22. Note, supra note 19, at 378.
23. Id.
24. See M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, 1 TAKEOVERS AND FREEZEOUTS 30 (1978).
Some of the conditions are: litigation, any material adverse change to the target's business,
competing offers, and an adverse action delaying the purchase of the target stock. Id. at 30-33.
25. See Comment, Should Tender Offer Arbitrage Be Regulated?, 1978 DuKE L.J. 1000,
1011.
26.

See E. ARANow & H. EINHORN, supra note 3, at 59-60.
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value.2 Second, shareholders can sell their stock on the open market.28

While realizing a profit in this instance, shareholders forego the opportunity to accept competing offers at a higher price.2 Thirdly, shareholders can retain their shares and hope the new company will provide
them future benefits.30 Shareholders, however, often lack sufficient
information or sophistication to predict effectively whether the new
31
company will succeed.

Because shareholders are ill-equipped to determine the proper
course of action, they often seek advice from the incumbent management.Y Management's response to tender offers, however, often fails
to consider the shareholders' interests.3 Management's desire to remain in control usually conflicts with the shareholders' need to receive
unbiased information from management about the offer.3 An arbitrageur3 can alleviate the shareholders' dilemma. Instead of tendering
to the acquiror, shareholders can sell shares to an arbitrageur.3 6 The
arbitrageur then tenders the shares at the premium price.37 This process allows shareholders to avoid the risks of holding stock which will
decrease in value if the tender offer fails.?
B.

The Williams Act

Prior to 1968, an offeror wishing to acquire a corporation could
gain control quickly and secretly through a cash tender offer.3 9 The

27.
28.
29.

Comment, supra note 25, at 1011 n.56.
Johnson, supra note 19, at 9.
Id.

30. Id. at 6.
31.
32.

Id.
Id.

33. A former SEC chairman characterized management's response to takeover offers as "a
self-interested effort by the officers and the individual directors of the target company to

maintain their entrenched positions, employment perquisites, and, most importantly, control."
Id. (quoting Full Disclosure of CorporateEquity Ownership in CorporateTakeover Bids: Hearings on S.510 Before the Subcomm. on Securitiesof the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency,
90th Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1967) (statement of Manuel F. Cohen, Chairman, SEC)).
34. Johnson, supra note 19, at 6.
35. An arbitrageur is a professional stock trader. In a tender offer context, arbitrageurs

make substantial open-market purchases of the target's shares at a price somewhere between
the market price of the target's shares prior to the offer and the tender price. The arbitrageur
then tenders those shares to the acquiror for a profit. E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note
3, at 173.
36.
37.
38.

Id.
Id.
Comment, supra note 25, at 1011-12.

39.

S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1967); H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 1st

Sess. 2 (1967); reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2811-2814.
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acquiring company did not need to disclose information to shareholders,
and management of the target company had no time to apprise
shareholders of their alternatives. 40 As a result, shareholders made
hasty, uninformed decisions whether to tender their shares. 41 In response to the abuse of the unregulated field of cash tender offers,4
Congress passed the Williams Act 43 in 1968 to regulate such offers.
The Williams Act, like all the Security and Exchange Acts of 1933
and 1934, 4 protects shareholders through full disclosure. 45 The Act
requires tender offerors seeking five percent or more of a publicly
held company's 46 equity securities 47 to ifie a schedule 14D-1 disclosure

40. See Note, Securities Law and the Constitution:State Tender Offer Statutes Reconsidered, 88 YALE L.J. 510, 512 (1979); see also supra note 39.
41. See supra note 40.
42. The Williams Act was designed to correct a perceived gap in federal securities law.
See H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong. 2d Sess., 2 reprintedin 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 2811, 2814. See also Cohen, A Note on Takeover Bids and CorporatePurchases of Stock,
22 Bus. LAw. 149 (1966) (supporting federal regulation); Mundheim, Why the Bill on Tender
Offers Should Not be Passed, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, May 1967, at 24 (against federal

regulation).
43. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1982).
44.

15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-bbb (1986).

45. Senator Williams, the chief sponsor of the Act, explained the purpose of the bill before
Congress. 'This legislation will close a significant gap in investor protection under the Federal
securities laws by requiring the disclosure of pertinent information to stockholders when persons
seek to obtain control of a corporation by a cash tender offer.... " 113 CONG. REc. 854 (1967).
See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 24-37 (1977) (discussing Williams Act disclosure
requirement and its purpose). Congress adopted a '"market approach" to ensure all shareholders
have enough information to evaluate the merits of a tender offer. The market approach contemplates a regulatory regime that, through full disclosure, enables shareholders to determine
the merits of a takeover bid. S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-4 (1967); H.R. REP.
No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-4 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 2811, 2812-14.

46. The Williams Act was made applicable to companies with a class of equity securities
registered under § 12 of the 1934 Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (1982). Section 12 applies to issuers
engaged in or affecting interstate commerce whose securities are either listed on a national
securities exchange or are held on record by at least 500 persons if the issuer has assets
exceeding $1 million. The $1 million figure has recently been raised to $3 million by the SEC
under its rulemaking authority in order to account for inflation. System of Classification for
Purposes of Exempting Small Issuers from Certain Reporting and Other Requirements, Exchange Act Release No. 18,647, 25 SEC Dock. 2080 (Apr. 15, 1982).
47. The 1934 Act defines equity securities as
any stock of similar security; or any security convertible, with or without consideration, into such a security, or carrying any warrant or right to subscribe to or
purchase such a security; or any such warrant or right; or any other security which
the Commission shall deem to be of similar nature and consider necessary or
appropriate, by such rules and regulations as it may prescribe in the public interest
or for the protection of investors, to treat as an equity security.
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(11) (1982). See 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a11-1 (1986).
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statement.4 8 The statement is filed with the Securities Exchange Commission at the commencement of the tender offer. 49 A summary of
this report, disclosing the tender offeror's identity,5 source and
amount of funds used in the takeover,s and the acquiring company's
plans concerning the target company5 2 must be distributed to the
shareholders.0 The Act further requires the target company's management provide shareholders with a reasoned statement5 of its positionr
within ten business days of the tender offer5 The Williams Act
explicitly seeks to maximize shareholder protection, but is carefully
tailored to avoid favoritism to 57either the acquiring company or the
target company's management.
The Williams Act further protects shareholders through three substantive provisions regulating tender offers. These provisions regulate
the withdrawal rights of tendering shareholders,5 the tender offeror's

48. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100 (1984). The acquiror must disclose its background and identity,
the source and amount of funds to be used in making the purchases, and its purpose in making
the purchases. Id. The SEC is authorized to require more information in order to protect
investors. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1982). The required additional information is set out in SEC
Rule 14D-6, 17 C.F.R. § 240-14d-6 (1984). See Schmults & Kelly, Disclosure in Connection
With Cash Take-over Bids: The New Regulations, 24 Bus. LAw. 19 (1968) (general discussion
of Williams Act disclosure requirements).
49. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (1982).
50. Id. § 78m(d)(1)(A).
51. Id. § 78m(d)(1)(B).
52. Id. § 78m(d)(1)(C).
53. Id. § 78m(d)(1).
54. The statement is on schedule 14D-9. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-9 (1984).
55. This is generally done prior to making recommendations to shareholders. Id.
56. Id. § 240.14e-2.
57. According to the Senate Committee:
The Committee has taken extreme care to avoid tipping the balance of regulation
either in favor of management or in favor of the person making the takeover bid.
The bill is designed to require full and fair disclosure for the benefit of investors
while at the same time providing the offeror and management equal opportunity
to fairly present their case.
S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-4 (1967). See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624,
633 (1982) ("[A] major aspect of the effort to protect the investor was to avoid favoring either
management or the takeover bidder."). The shift away from the original Williams bill's antitakeover stance indicates congressional intent in tender offer regulation. The legislative history
of the Act indicates Congress, determined to leave tender offer markets unobstructed, recognized
that tender offers may benefit target investors and the national economy. Note, supra note 8,
at 437 n.25. See Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1277 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd
on other grounds, Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 1973 (1979).
58. The Act provides for withdrawal rights within the first seven days of the offer and 60
days after the offer becomes effective. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1982).
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duties to purchase when an offer is oversubscribed,69 and the consideration paid to tendering shareholders. ° The Act also contains an

of both the
anti-fraud provision 61 which applies to the management
62
target company and the acquiring company.
C.

The First Generation State Takeover Statutes

State legislatures developed statutes to correct perceived weaknesses in the Williams Act. 3 Acting pursuant to their police powersr"
and the savings and protection clause of the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act,6 states enacted a wide variety of takeover legislation.
Certain core provisions, however, were included in most of these state
statutes. Generally, states required more disclosure than the federal
scheme.6 Most states also required advance disclosure of tender offers,
rather than concurrent disclosure as under the Williams Act.67 The

59. When a tender offer is made for less than all of the total outstanding shares of the
target, the offer may be oversubscribed. The Act requires the offeror to take up tendered
shares pro rata, according to the number of securities tendered by each shareholder in the first
10 days of the offer. If the consideration for target shares is increased, a new pro rata period
is applicable for 10 days after the increase. Id. § 78n(d)(6).
60. If a tender offeror increases the consideration offered to nontendering shareholders,
that increase must be paid to all tendering shareholders, after the increase. Id. § 78n(d)(7). See
H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 11, reprintedin, 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws 2811, 2822.
61.

15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982).

62. Id. The anti-fraud provision makes it unlawful to make any untrue statement or material
omission, or to engage in any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative practices in connection
with any tender offer. Id.
63. The stated intent behind these provisions is to give investors more time to consider
the tender offer's merits. Some states, however, clearly wanted to protect local businessmen
who were concerned that outsiders would close down plants and leave local residents unemployed.
E. ARANOw & H. EINHORN, supra note 3, at 153. See, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 292.560.991 (Baldwin 1986) (prevention of takeover bids). But see Note, supra note 40, at 524 (state
takeover provisions' delay makes it easier to insure full disclosure and help to reduce the pressure
atmosphere surrounding a tender offer).
64. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
65. This clause permits concurrent federal and state securities regulation. 15 U.S.C. §
78bb(a) (1982). This provision also provides that nothing in the 1934 Act will affect jurisdiction
of state securities commissions if the commissions do not conflict with the provisions or rules
of the 1934 Act. Id. See Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 182 n.13 (1979).
66. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 22-1902(b) (Supp. 1984); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 552.05(2)(c)
(West special pamphlet 1987). See also Note, A Failed Experiment: State Takeover Regulation
After Edgar v. MITE Corp., 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 456, 463.
67. Notification period varies between statutes. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 1602
(McKinney 1986) (no extra period); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 67-1264.2(S) (1980) (10 day period);
ILL. Bus. TAKEOVER AcT § 4, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 , para. 137.45(E) (1981) (20 day
period) (repealed by MITE decision); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 78B-4(a) (1981) (30 day period).
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most controversial state provisions authorized states' securities commissions to hold administrative hearings and determine the fairness
of the tender offer.6s The commissions could halt the tender offer
pending the hearing, and even disapprove of an offer. 69
Proponents of state takeover legislation suggested that the provisions gave investors more time to consider the merits of a tender
offer, conforming with the Williams Act's intent.7 Opponents criticized
the state legislation as favoring management of target companies by
affording additional time to mount opposition to takeover bids. 71 This
favoring of target companies, opponents argued, was in direct conflict
with the neutrality Congress encouraged in the Williams Act. 72
States also expanded the definition of target company to include
companies incorporated in-state, having their principal place of business in-state, or having a certain percentage of shareholders in-state.73
The expanded definition extended a state's jurisdiction to include even
transactions occurring outside its boundaries. 74 This extended jurisdiction, together with substantive differences between the state and federal scheme, led to the invalidation of the first generation state
takeover statutes. 7

68. See, e.g., ILL. Bus. TAKEOVER ACT § 7, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 /2 para. 137.57E
(1981) (repealed 1983); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 110C, § 2 (Law. Co-op. 1984); N.Y. Bus. CORP.
LAW § 1604 (McKinney 1986).
69. Administrative determinations deciding the fairness have been severely criticized. See
Sargent, On the Validity of State Takeover Regulation: State Responses to MITE and Kidwell,
42 OHIO ST. L.J. 689, 719 (1981).
70. Id. at 717.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 , para. 137.52(10) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983-1984).
See generally E. ARANOw & H. EINHORN, supra,note 3, at 23445 (discussing states' definitions
of target companies).
74. See Warren, Developments in State Takeover Regulation: MITE and Its Aftermath,
40 Bus. LAW. 671, 678 (1985).
75. See, e.g., Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 637 F.2d 182 (3d Cir. 1980) (New Jersey statute
violates supremacy clause); MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1980) (Illinois statute
violates commerce and supremacy clauses), affd sub nom., Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S.
624 (1982); Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978) (Idaho statute
violates commerce and supremacy clauses), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Leroy v. Great
W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979); Empire, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 524 F. Supp. 898 (W.D. Mo.
1981) (Missouri statute violates commerce and supremacy clauses); Seagram & Sons v. Marley
[1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,246 (W.D. Okla. July 17, 1981)
(Oklahoma statute violates commerce clause); Natomas Co. v. Bryan, 512 F. Supp. 191 (D. Nev.
1981) (Nevada statute violates commerce and supremacy clauses); Crane Co. v. Lain, 509 F.
Supp. 782 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (Pennsylvania statute violates commerce and supremacy clauses);
Hi-Shear Indus., Inc. v. Campbell, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,804
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D. States' Motivation
Many state legislators felt the Williams Act inadequately protected
their constituents. 76 Generally, state interest centered around three

areas: protecting investors, protecting "noninvestor constituencies"
such as employees and suppliers, and protecting economic and social
interests of the affected community. 77 States advanced these interests

by imposing requirements on tender offers in addition to those imposed
by the federal scheme.
The states' main interest is investor protection which conforms

with the Williams Act policy of investor protection through disclosure. 78 States often emphasize the need for more disclosure to improve
investor decisionmaking, since relatively small shareholders often lose
the benefits of the takeover offer as well as their equity position in
the company. 79 Other states stress that rapid changes in corporate
control and the lack of corporate approval mechanisms associated with
other acquisition techniques necessitate state regulation of the tender

offer process2 °
By further regulating tender offers, states protect employees and sup-

pliers of the target company., While target company directors clearly
(D.S.C. Dec. 4, 1980) (South Carolina statute violates commerce and supremacy clauses); Brascan
Ltd. v. Lassiter, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 98,247 (E.D. La. Apr.
30, 1979) (Louisiana statute violates supremacy clause); Dart Indus. v. Conrad, 462 F. Supp.
1 (S.D. Ind. 1978) (Delaware statute violates commerce and supremacy clauses); Kelly ex tel.
McLaughlin v. Beta-X Corp., 103 Mich. App. 51, 302 N.W.2d 596 (1981) (Michigan statute
violates supremacy clause); Eure v. Grand Metro. Ltd., [1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 97,694 (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 18, 1980) (North Carolina statute violates supremacy
clause). But see AMCA Int'l Corp. v. Krouse, 482 F. Supp. 929 (S.D. Ohio 1979) (Ohio statute
not violative of commerce or supremacy clause); City Investing Co. v. Simcox, 476 F. Supp.
112 (S.D. Ind. 1979) (Indiana statute not violative of commerce or supremacy clauses), affid on
othergrounds, 633 F.2d 56 (7th Cir. 1980); Wylain, Inc. v. TRE Corp., 412 A.2d 338 (Del. Ch.
1980) (Delaware statute not violative of commerce or supremacy clauses); Sharon Steel Corp.
v. Whaland, 121 N.H., 607, 433 A.2d 1250 (1981) (New Hampshire statute not violative of
commerce or supremacy clauses), vacated and remanded, 458 U.S. 1101 (1982) (vacated and
remanded for consideration in light of Edgar v. MITE Corp. decision), rev'd, Sharon Steel Corp.
v. Whaland, 124 N.H.-., 466 A.2d 919 (1983) (New Hampshire statute violates commerce clause).
76. Grimm, The Tender Offer Regulation Battle Continues: Should States Regulate Only
Local Companies?, 60 IND. L.J. 721, 745 (1985).
77. Id. at n.101.
78. See Sargent, supra note 69, at 693.
79. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 23-2-3.1-5 (Burns 1982); see also Grimm, supra note 76,
at 745.
80. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.832(A)(2) (Page 1982); see also Grimm, supra
note 76, at 745.
81. See Grimm, supra note 76, at 745. These employees and suppliers tend to reside in the
state that is regulating the tender offer.
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have a fiduciary duty to act in the shareholder's best interest, this duty
may not extend to employees and suppliers. 2 Employees and suppliers,
however, may have a significant stake in the resulting business combination.82 Whether directors should have the authority to oppose a
bid on the grounds that it is not in the employees' and suppliers' best
interest is the subject of debate.2 However, by further regulating
tender offers, state statutes better protect employees and suppliers.2
In fact, the second generation Pennsylvania takeover statute," following the City Code on Take-Overs and Mergers,17 permits directors to
consider the interests of employees and suppliers, along with those of
shareholders, in determining the target's reaction to a bid.88
States are further concerned with a takeover's impact on the
economic and social interests of the target company's community. A
new business combination may result in antitrust problems which require the divestiture of plants.9 A takeover may result in the transfer
or dismissal of key employees ° These events directly impact the local
community by affecting tax revenue or unemployment compensation
payments. 91 Takeovers indirectly affect the local community in other
ways.92 For example, employee transfers or dismissals may diminish
the revenues of local businesses that supplied goods and services to
the target company's employees. 93

82. See Greene & Junewicz, A Reappraisalof CurrentRegulation of Mergers and Acquisitions, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 647, 733 (1984).
83. Id.
84. Compare Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAw. 101, 105-06
(1979) (defending responsibility to employees) with Easterbrook & Fischel, The ProperRole of
a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARv. L. REV. 1161, 1190-92
(1981) (rejecting any obligations to employees and other nonshareholder group).
85. Change in ownership can mean loss of employment for employees and loss of the buyerseller relationship for suppliers.
86. For a discussion of similar statutes, see infra notes 148-62 and accompanying text.
87. Council for the Securities Industry, The City Code on Take-Overs and Mergers (1981)
[hereinafter City Code]. The City Code on Takeovers and Mergers regulates the conduct of
tender offers in the United Kingdom.
88. See 15 PA. CONS. STAT ANN. § 1910 (Purdon Supp. 1987); see also City Code, supra
note 87, at 15 (General Principle 11).
89. See Greene & Junewicz, supra note 82, at 734.
90. Id.
91.

Id.

92. Id.
93. Id. See also Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 647 (1982) (Powell, J., concurring)
(Management personnel, who often provide community leadership, may move to new corporate
headquarters. Contributions to cultural, charitable, and educational life, in terms of leadership
and financial support, also diminish when corporate headquarters moves.).
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E. Edgar v. MITE Corporation
The Supreme Court sounded the death knell for the first generation
of state takeover statutes in Edgar v. MITE Corp.Y In MITE, the
MITE Corporation complied with the Williams Act in its takeover
attempt but did not comply with the Illinois takeover statute.95 MITE
sought a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against enforcement of the Illinois statute contending the Williams Act preempted
the statute and imposed an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce.9 The state argued it had an interest in protecting resident
shareholders from fraudulent and inequitable tender offers and in reg97
ulating the internal affairs of domestic corporations.
The Supreme Court struck down the Illinois statute, but handed
down six divergent opinions.9 Citing the balancing test of Pike v.
Bruce Church, Inc.,9 the Court's majority held the Illinois takeover
statute violated the commerce clause.1°° Illinois asserted that it had
the power to determine whether a tender offer could proceed for
shares held by non-Illinois residents.' 0' The Court reasoned Illinois
1
had no legitimate interest in protecting out-of-state shareholders. 02
While Illinois had a legitimate interest in protecting in-state shareholders, federal regulation of tender offers was adequate. According to
the majority, any additional benefit from the state scheme was
"speculative."'' The majority concluded that the Illinois statute im-

94.

Mite, 457 U.S. at 624.

95. Id. The Illinois Business Takeover Act required registration of any tender offer with
the Illinois Secretary of State. The statute also imposed a 20 day precommencement waiting
period, during which state officials could initiate hearings determining the substantive fairness
of the offer. The statute defined "target company" as any corporation of which Illinois shareholders own 10% of the equity securities subject to the tender offer, as well as any corporation

with its principal executive offices in Illinois, a corporation organized under Illinois law, or a
corporation with at least 10% of its stated capital and paid-in surplus represented within the
state. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 , para. 137.51 to .70 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983-1984), repealed
by Act. No. 83-365, 1983 Ill.
Legis. Serv. 2628 (West).
96. MITE, 457 U.S. at 628 (1982).

97.

Id. at 644-45.

98.

Justice White joined by Chief Justice Burger, delivered the Court's opinion. Justices

Stevens, O'Connor, and Powell each wrote separate concurring opinions. Justices Marshall and
Rehnquist filed separate dissenting opinions.
99. 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). See infra text accompanying notes 168-70.
100. MITE, 457 U.S. at 643-45.
101. Id. at 642. This could cause various burdens such as depriving out of state shareholders

the chance to sell their stock at a premium. Id. at 643.
102. Id. at 644. Out-of-state shareholders constituted 73% of the total shareholders in the
target corporation. Id. at 642.
103. Id. at 644-45.
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posed substantial burdens on interstate commerce. 10 The Court invalidated the statute because it imposed a substantial burden on interstate
10 5
commerce which outweighed its putative benefits.
Three justices found the Illinois statute unconstitutional on supremacy clause grounds. 16 The justices reasoned that precommencement
notification, 0 7 administrative hearing,38 and fairness provisions3g favored target management and reduced investor autonomy. Favoring
the target company frustrated the Williams Act's objective to maintain
neutrality between the acquiring company and the target company's
management."10 Thus, these justices found that the Williams Act
preempted the Illinois statute.,"
Justices Stevens12 and Powell' expressed support for state
takeover legislation. Justice Powell concurred with the majority opinion's commerce clause analysis because it left room for state regulation
of tender offers. "14 States may regulate tender offers, but must tailor
their statutes narrowly to comport with the Williams Act." 5 One commentator noted, however, that the preemption question was still un-

104. Id. at 646.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 63040. Justice White could only secure the concurrence of Chief Justice Burger
and Justice Blackmun.
107. Id. at 635. "[B]y providing the target company with additional time within which to
take steps to combat the offer, the precommencement notification provisions furnish incumbent
management with a powerful tool to combat tender offers, perhaps to the detriment of the
stockholders . .. ." Id.
108. Id. at 639. '"The potential for delay provided by the hearing provisions upset the
balance struck by Congress by favoring management at the expense of stockholders." Id.
109. Id. at 640. "[T]he state thus offers investor protection at the expense of investor
autonomy - an approach quite in conflict with that adopted by Congress." Id. (quoting MITE
Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486, 494 (7th Cir. 1980), prob. juris. noted, 451 U.S. 968 (1981), affd,
457 U.S. 624 (1982)).
110. MITE, 457 U.S. at 63340.
111. Id. at 639.
112. Id. at 647 (Stevens, J., concurring).
113. Id. at 646 (Powell, J., concurring).
114. Id. (Powell, J., concurring).
115. Id. at 644. Justice White, in his commerce clause analysis, recognized the states' role
in regulating securities transactions occurring within the regulating states, citing the Blue Sky
Cases. Id. at 641-43. The Blue Sky Cases upheld the constitutionality of state blue sky laws
against commerce clause attacks. See Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539 (1917); Caldwell
v. Sioux Falls Stock Yards Co., 242 U.S. 568 (1917). Justice White was careful to distinguish
the challenged Illinois statute on the basis of its applicability to transactions occurring "wholly
outside the State of Illinois." MITE, 457 U.S. at 641.
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resolved and even the commerce clause holding could be distinguished
116
with respect to statutes of narrower scope.
The judicial response to MITE was to significantly limit the area
of state tender offer regulation. 117 After MITE, the Fourth,"" Sixth," 9
Eighth, 20 and Tenth Circuits'2 ' applied the Supreme Court's commerce
clause or supremacy clause analysis in striking down state takeover
statutes. Only the First Circuit refused to strike down a similar challenge of a Massachusetts takeover statute. 12 One federal district court
judge interpreted MITE as holding that federal law superceded state
regulation of securities transactions."2 However, Justice White, writing for the MITE court, confirmed the validity of both blue sky laws
1
and the state law savings clause in the 1934 Act."
II.

SECOND GENERATION STATE TAKEOVER STATUTES

Since the MITE decision, a second generation of state takeover
statutes has emerged. Instead of retooling old statutes, state legislatures are redrafting statutes to conform to the MITE decision and its
progeny.1

116. See L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 535 (1988). See also
Profusek & Gompf, State Takeover LegislationAfter MITE: Standing Pat, Blue Sky, or Corporation Law Concepts?, 7 CORP. L. REV. 3, 20 (1984) ("nothing in MITE completely ousts the
states from regulating interstate tender offers").
117. See generally Warren, supra note 74, at 686-94 (discussing the circuits' response to
MITE).
118. See Telvest, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 697 F.2d 576 (4th Cir. 1983) (Virginia statute violates
commerce clause).
119. See Martin-Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 690 F.2d 558 (6th Cir. 1982) (Michigan
statute violates commerce clause).
120. See National City Lines, Inc. v. LLC Corp., 687 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1982) (Missouri
statute violates commerce and supremacy clauses).
121. See Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Cities Serv. Co., 715 F.2d 1425 (10th Cir. 1983) (Oklahoma
statute violates commerce clause).
122. See Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Connolly, 686 F.2d 1029 (1st Cir. 1982).
123. See Conkling v. Moseley, Hailgarten, Estabrook & Weeden, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 760,
761 (D. Mass. 1983).
124. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 641 (1982) (quoting Leroy v. Great W. United
Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 182 n.13 (1979)).
125. For a partial list of statutes, see infra notes 127 & 143. Pennsylvania and Maine
adopted fair value statutes which are patterned after the appraisal-type remedy traditionally
accorded by state law to shareholders who dissent from a merger. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 13A § 910 (1985); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1910 (Purdon Supp. 1987). Some states
passed legislation requiring registration and filing of certain information before an offer to
acquire a threshold percentage of any class of the target's stock. These statutes are called
registration and disclosure laws. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 80B.01-.13 (West Supp. 1986).
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Florida legislators introduced takeover legislation within days of
the CTS decision. British publisher Robert Maxwell's bid for Harcourt
Brace Jovanovich, Inc. focused attention on the bill and hurried its
passage. 126 Florida's new takeover statutes contain both fair price provisions and control share acquisition provisions.
A.

Control Share Acquisition Statutes

Eleven states, including Florida, enacted a form of control share
acquisition statutes.' 7 Typically, control share acquisition statutes require prior notice by the acquiror, and shareholder approvalm of any
control share acquisition, which is defined as the acquisition of shares
above a specified threshold.' Shareholders are thus given the power
to disapprove acquisitions of the shares of domestic corporations which
may cause a change in control. These statutes usually regulate not
only tender offers but also open market transactions and other types
of share transactions in which a specific degree of control is acquired. 30
Control share acquisition statutes apply to any corporation that
has a certain amount or percentage of resident shareholders, and has
its principal place of business, principal executive offices, or substantial
assets in the state. 13 A company acquiring a controlling share must
comply with statutory standards each time it acquires a threshold

126. Harcourt Brace fought off Ir. Maxwell with a recapitalization plan but the state
continued with its legislation. Interestingly, the two reasons given by Senator Toni Jennings
(R-Orlando), a co-sponsor of the bill, were a fear the Orlando-based publishing operation would
be moved out-of-state, and that Maxwell's socialist politics might taint textbooks published by
Harcourt Brace. Senator Jennings was quoted: "I don't agree with socialism and I don't want
that in my textbooks in my country." Moline, Panel Votes to Limit Hostile Takeovers, United
Press Int'l (May 26, 1987) (NEXIS, Regional News, Fla.).
127. See FLA. STAT. § 607.109 (1987); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 416-171 to -172 (Supp. 1985);
IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1-42-1 to -42-11 (Burns Supp. 1986); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A,
§ 910 (1987); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.671 (West Supp. 1986); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.407
(Vernon Supp. 1986); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.831 (Page 1985); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
§ 1910 (Purdon Supp. 1986); UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10-76.5 (Supp. 1987); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 180.25, .69 (West Supp. 1986) (repealed 1986).
128. Some statutes, such as Ohio and Missouri, require approval both by all stockholders
voting as a group and by all disinterested stockholders voting separately. Other states, such
as Hawaii and Florida, only require the approval of disinterested shareholders.
129. Control share acquisition is usually defined as an acquisition giving a bidder at least
20% of the target company's voting stock. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 607.109(1) (1987); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 1701.831 (Page 1985).
130. See Kreider, Fortress Without Foundation? Ohio Takeover Act II, 52 U. CIN. L.
REV. 108, 112 (1983).
131. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 607.109(4) (West 1987).
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zone of control. 132 The acquiring company must submit an acquiring

person's statement to the target company. 13 This statement must disclose the acquiror's identity,"' its current interest in the corporation,"3
the range of voting power to be acquired, 1" terms of the acquisition,"37
and the acquiror's financial ability to complete the purchase. 13 Unless
the articles of incorporation vest approval power in the board of directors,13 9 the target company must call a special shareholders' meeting
within fifty days. 140 The shareholders must determine whether the
acquiring company's control shares have voting rights.'4 ' The offer
cannot be consummated without the requisite shareholder approval.'4'
If shareholders approve of the control share acquisition, dissenting
shareholders have the right to receive the fair value of their shares. 143
Unlike other state takeovers statutes, the Florida statute also
applies to certain foreign corporations." The statute contains criteria
which a foreign corporation must meet to fall under the statutes'
purview. 1 The statute does not apply to foreign corporations incorporated in states which have laws expressly inconsistent with Florida's
provisions.146 Florida's statute also contains a section severing any
provisions of the fair price and control share acquisition statutes found
invalid. 4 7

132. See, e.g., id. § 607.109(1). The zones are 20%, 33 1/3%, and 50%. Id.
133. See id. § 607.109(6).
134. See id. § 607.109(6)(a).
135. See id. § 607.109(6)(c).
136. See id. § 607.109(6)(d).
137. See id. § 607.109(6)(e)(1).
138. See id. § 607.109(6)(e)(2).
139. See id. § 607.109(7)(a); see also Kreider, supra note 130, at 115.
140. FLA. STAT. § 607.109(7)(b) (1987).
141. See id. § 607.109(9).
142. However, nothing in the statutes prohibits acquirors from commencing the tender
offer upon submission of the acquiring person's statement. See Kreider, supra note 130, at 119.
143. FLA. STAT. § 607.109(11) (1987).
144. Id. § 607.110. This provision applies to both the control share acquisition statute and
the fair price statute. Id.
145. Id. § 607.110(1)(a)-(f) (1987). The foreign corporation must have been granted authority
to conduct business in Florida, and have 100 or more shareholders, and its principal place of
business, with its principal office, or substantial assets within Florida. The foreign corporation
must have more than 500 Florida residents as employees, gross annual payroll of more than
five million dollars to Florida residents, and either more than 10% of its shareholders' residents
in Florida, or more than 10% of its shares owned by Florida residents, or more than 1,000
shareholders' residents in Florida. Id.
146. Id. § 607.110(3).
147. Id. See also Fla. H.R. 35 § 6 (Reg. Sess. 1987, introduced by Rep. Carlton).
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B. Fair Price Statutes
Fair price statutes are the most popular second generation takeover
statutes.148 These statutes typically regulate the second step of a
takeover where the acquiror, after achieving some control in the first
step of a tender offer, seeks to consolidate one hundred percent ownership through a freeze-out merger.149 The purpose of these statutes
is to ensure that shareholders who did not tender their shares in the
first step tender offer do not receive a lower price in the second step

freeze-out transaction.'

°

Fair price statutes often require that either two supermajority
votes approve the freeze-out transaction, or the bidder pay a "fair

price" to the stockholders.151 A supermajority vote provision usually
requires eighty percent of all outstanding voting shares, 52 and two1m
thirds of all outstanding voting shares not owned by the bidder.

Florida's statute only requires approval by two-thirds of the disinterested shareholders.1m The supermajority provision can be avoided
if the price paid to shareholders in the second step of the transaction

148.

States that have enacted fair price statutes in chronological order are: MD. CORPS.

& ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 3-601 to -603 (1985); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-374a to -374c
(West Supp. 1986); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.108 (West 1987); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 14-2-232 to
-234 (1986 Cum. Supp.); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32 para. 11.35-.70 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 271A.396-.398 (Baldwin Supp. 1987); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12.132-.134
(West Supp. 1986); MIcH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 450.1775 - .1784 (West Supp. 1987); Miss.
CODE ANN. §§ 79-25-1 to -25-7 (Supp. 1987); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 513(e) (McKinney 1986);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1409.1 (Purdon Supp. 1986); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-725 to -728
(1985); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 23A.08.425 (Supp. 1987); Wis. STAT.ANN. § 180.725 (West
Supp. 1987); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-43-1 to -43-24 (Burns Supp. 1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§
14A:10-1 to -6 (West Supp. 1987).
149. A two-tier tender offer is a transaction in which a partial cash tender offer is followed
by an offer for less than the cash consideration. See L. Loss, supra note 116, at 499. In the
first tier of a two-tier takeover bid, the offeror gains control of the target through open market
purchases of target shares, privately negotiated purchases, or a tender offer. In the second
tier, the purchaser or tender offeror uses its control to obtain complete ownership of the target,
usually by merging the target corporation into itself. See Toms, Compensating Shareholders
Frozen Out in Two-Step Mergers, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 548, 548 (1978).
150. See Scriggins & Clarke, Takeovers and the 1983 Maryland FairPrice Legislation, 43
AID. L. REV. 266, 266-67, 272-73 (1984).
151. See Note, supra note 8; Hanks, Maryland-Type Takeover Statutes: Are They "Fair
Price" or Foaul Ball?, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 8, 1986, at 32, Col. 3.
152. See, e.g., MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 3-602(1) (1985).
153. Id. § 3-601(j). Acquiror company becomes an interested stockholder when it acquires
10% or more of target's voting power, or is an affiliate to the corporation owning 10% or more
of target's voting power within two years of the date in question. Id. § 3-601(j)(i), (ii).
154. FLA.STAT. § 607.108(2) (1987).
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meets prescribed fair price standards. 155 Generally, acquirors and
shareholders examine alternate methods for determining the fair price,
and use the formula yielding the greatest price. 156
Even if the acquiring company obtains the supermajority vote,
certain states provide for superappraisal rights requiring the acquiror
to pay off any dissenting shareholders in accordance with the fair price
standard.157 Most fair price provisions also prohibit the acquiror from
purchasing any additional shares of the target's stock after becoming
an interested shareholder. 158 These provisions effectively prohibit
159
"creeping" tender offers.

Many fair price statutes also provide exceptions to their application,
such as when the target company's board of directors approves of the
transaction before the acquiring company becomes "interested."'6 In
addition, corporations may opt out of the fair price provision by a
supermajority shareholder vote, or if the corporate charter so provides.' 6' Generally, the statutes' only nexus requirement is that the
corporation be incorporated in-state.16 The typical fair price statute,
therefore, applies to both resident and non-resident shareholders.

155. Id. § 607.108(4).
156. See, e.g., id. "Fair price" is usually defined as the highest of: (1) the highest price
paid by the bidder at any time prior to a certain period before the freeze-out transaction
announcement; (2) the highest price paid by a transaction bidder who became an interested
shareholder; (3) the price on the date when the bidder became an interested shareholder; (4)
the announcement date price of the freeze-out transaction; or (5) the higher of (3)
or (4) multiplied
by a fraction in which the numerator is (1) and the denominator is the price paid by the bidder
on the first day of the clause (1) period. Hanks, State Takeover Laws: The Second Generation,
Nat'l L.J., Nov. 3, 1986, col. 3.
157.

E.g., MD.CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 3-603(b) (1985). Florida's statute does not

have an equivalent because dissenters' rights are discussed in the control share acquisition
statute.
158. E.g., MD.CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 3-603(b) (1985) (fair price provision avoids
the supermajority vote).
159. A "creeping tender offer" is an acquisition strategy whereby the target company's
stock is purchased on the open market, usually over an extended period of time. Creeping
tender offers are regulated by the Williams Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1982). When
a purchaser acquires more than 5% of the equity security of a company, the purchasers must
file a 13D Statement with the SEC stating whether the purchaser's intent is to gain control of
the corporation. Id. See generallyNote, Developments in CorporateTakeover Techniques: Creep.
ing Tender Offers, Lockup Arrangements, and Standstill Agreements, 39 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1095 (1982) (discussing creeping tender offers).
160. Connecticut, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, and Michigan use this exception. Hanks,
supra note 156, at 34.
161. See, e.g., MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 3-603(d) (1985).
162. See Hanks, supra note 156, at 34.
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III.

CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF SECOND GENERATION
STATE TAKEOVER STATUTES

Second generation state takeover statutes have increasingly come
under constitutional attack.c This attack occurs on two fronts, under
the commerce clause and under the supremacy clause.
A.

ConstitutionalProvisions

1. Commerce Clause
Article I, section eight of the Constitution provides that, "Congress
shall have power... [t]o regulate commerce.., among the several
states."'1 4 The Supreme Court also may limit the power of the states
to erect barriers against interstate trade. '5 Direct regulation of interstate commerce by the states is prohibited.'6 In the absence of conflicting federal legislation, however, states may exercise their police pow-

ers over matters of legitimate local concern, even if the state law
affects interstate commerce. 6 7 Commerce clause analysis involves a
balancing test.'6 As held in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 169 a state may
regulate to effectuate a legitimate local public interest unless the bur-

den imposed on interstate commerce is excessive in relation to the
public interest.170
2.

Supremacy Clause

Article VI of the Constitution provides that, "This Constitution,
and the Laws made in pursuance thereof. . . shall be the Supreme
Laws of the Land. ' 17' If Congress intends to occupy an entire field,
then any state regulation on the subject is invalid.'7 But in the absence
of federal occupation of the field, the test is whether the state law

163. See Hersch & Kearney, State Takeover Laws: The Third Generation, in 1 18TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 423, 436-44 (1986).

164. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
165. See Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 35 (1980). See also Edgar v. MITE
Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 640 (1982) (commerce clause limits state power).
166. MITE, 457 U.S. at 640.
167. See Lewis, 447 U.S. at 36; MITE, 457 U.S. at 640.
168. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
169. Id.
170. Id. at 142. If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes one of
degree. The amount of burden tolerated will depend on the nature of the local interest involved
and whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities. Id.
171. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
172. See, e.g., Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 631 (1982); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312
U.S. 52, 66-67 (1941); Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Connolly, 686 F.2d 1029, 1036 (1st Cir. 1982).
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conflicts with the federal law.'7 The mere possibility of state-federal
conflict is not sufficient to justify preemption. 174 A conflict exists when
compliance with both federal and state regulation is a physical impossibility or when the state law frustrates the purposes and objectives
of Congress.1Y5 The proper approach in preemption cases is to reconcile
the operation of both state and federal laws rather than completely
invalidate the state law.176
B. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corporation of America: A New Dawn
for State Regulation
1. Commerce Clause Analysis
In CTS, the Supreme Court did not explicitly reject MITE's commerce clause analysis. The Court held that corporations owe their
existence and attributes to state law and that states have a great
interest in governing corporations their laws create.'7 States may also
define shareholders' voting rights so long as the laws do not directly
discriminate against out-of-state shareholders.17s
The Court reasoned that every state has enacted laws regulating
corporate governance and that by prohibiting certain transactions, and
regulating others, states affect interstate commerce. 79 Thus, an acceptable aspect of the business landscape in this country is for states
to create corporations, prescribe their powers, and define the rights
that are acquired by purchasing their shares. 18° The Court found that
states have a significant interest in promoting stable relationships
among parties involved in the corporations they charter, and also in
ensuring that investors in such corporations have an effective voice
in corporate affairs181

173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

MITE, 457 U.S. at 631.
See, e.g., Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 554-55 (1973).
Id. (citing Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 14243 (1963)).
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117, 127 (1983).
CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 107 S. Ct. 1637, 1649 (1987).

178.
179.
180.
181.

Id.
Id. at 1650.
Id.
Id. at 1651. The Court further held that the Indiana Act applied only to corporations

having a substantial number of shareholders in Indiana. Thus, the Act affects many Indiana
residents whom Indiana has a high interest in protecting. Id. at 1652. If this second justification

is necessary for a state takeover statute to survive a commerce clause attack, Delaware's statute
is endangered because most Delaware corporation shareholders do not reside in Delaware. See
R. GILSON, Note: How FarDoes CTS Go and Does Anyone Want to Go There?, in LAw AND
FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISrrIONS 193 (Supp. 1987).
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In a strong dissent, Justice White argued that the restraint on the
transfer of voting rights impedes the transfer of shares. 18 The Indiana
statute, like the Illinois statute in MITE, restrained transfers of shares
by shareholders to a third party. The dissent criticized the majority
for classifying the statute as merely defining the attributes of shares
when the statute's practical effect was to restrain stock transferability.

83

The dissent further argued that state laws permitting a majority
of shareholders to prevent acquisition by individual investors, including
out-of-state tender offerors, frustrate any transfer of corporate control.' Because the statutes by design thwart liquidation or removal
of a company from the state, Justice White argued that the statutes
83
are the archetypes of state law that the commerce clause forbids.'
State statutes comport with the federal scheme of shareholder
protection through adequate disclosure. When state takeover statutes
protect local shareholders by requiring that tender offers be made on
the same terms to residents and nonresidents, the statutes further
local interests. However, state statutes could apply to transactions
between two nonresidents where the corporation is a nonresident.
This type of transaction would not involve any local putative benefit. 8 6
One state motivation in passing takeover legislation is to protect
various local interests arising from the existence of corporations within
M

the state. 187 Courts have considered the protection of local interests

a legitimate goal. 83 However, as Justice White's dissent points out,
while it is in the state's best interest to keep corporations and their
benefits within the state's borders, such protectionism is exactly what
the commerce clause was intended to prevent. 8 9 State legislation effectively allows states to keep corporations within their borders and
hinder the market for corporate control.
The CTS decision represents a major shift in the Court's view of state
takeover statutes. For the first time, a court found that resident share-

182. Id. at 1655 (White, J., dissenting).
183. Id.
184. Id. at 1656.
185. Id. The dissent distinguished blue sky laws on the grounds that the control share
acquisition statute regulated the purchase and sale of stock unlike blue sky laws. Id.
186. Compare MITE, 457 U.S. at 644 (no legitimate interest in protecting nonresident
shareholders) with CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1651 (state has no interest in protecting nonresident
shareholders of nonresident corporations).
187. For a discussion of states' motivations in passing takeover legislation, see supra notes
76-93 and accompanying text.
188. See MITE, 457 U.S. at 646 (Powell, J., concurring).
189. CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1656 (White, J., dissenting).
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holder protection outweighed burdens imposed on interstate commerce.

Shareholder protection is a valid state interest. 19° Most decisions prior
to CTS considered protection of resident shareholders a local benefit
which was outweighed by the burdens imposed on interstate commerce.' 9' Further, all but one of those decisions'9 rejected regulation

of corporate internal affairs as a justification for the statutes.

93

New control share acquisition statutes are generally part of states'
corporate codes. By providing for shareholder votes, the statutes operate within the states' scope of authority to regulate the internal

affairs of their corporations.'9 A state's authority to govern corporations through its corporations law is not restricted to transactions that
take place within the state. 95 The Seventh Circuit's decision in CTS
eliminated shareholders' power to vote in a control share acquisition
transaction. This destroyed the state's mechanism for permiting corporate shareholders to determine the corporation's future.' s Thus, the

Supreme Court's decision in CTS does not reduce state power in an
area traditionally thought of as subject solely to state regulation. 197
190. See, e.g., MITE, 457 U.S. at 644.
191. Hanks, supra note 156, at 34. For a list of those decisions, see Hersch & Kearney,
supra note 163.
192. Icahn v. Blunt, 612 F. Supp. 1400 (D. Mo. 1985). The Missouri Control Share Acquisition statute was found unconstitutional. Id. The statute was a direct burden on interstate
commerce because it applied to non-Missouri corporations and purported to regulate transactions
between non-Missouri buyers and sellers. Id. at 1415. Interestingly, the Missouri statute was
also a rather obvious attempt to protect TWA management from a takeover by Mr. Icahn.
TWA was the only corporation which would trigger the statute's requirements and the Act was
written and passed in only two days. Id. at 1406 n.2.
193. See supra note 191.
194. Profusek & Gompf, supra note 116, at 37.
The legitimacy of a state's interest in regulating the terms under which corporations
may organize and reorganize has long been recognized ....
[S]tate law governs
the internal affairs of a corporation, and the validity of such regulation is beyond
such preadventure except as to circumstances in which Congress... has expressly
ordained otherwise.
Id. "Corporations are creatures of state law, and investors commit their funds to corporate
directors on the understanding that.., state law will govern the internal affairs of the corporation." Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975).
195. Shipman, Some Thoughts About the Role of State Takeover Legislation: The Ohio
Takeover Act, 21 CASE W. RES. 722, 740 (1970). A state's general corporation law is global in
nature and governs internal operations of companies incorporated within the state. Id. In contrast, a state's blue sky laws or securities law, are territorial in nature, covering only "offers,
purchases, and sales which to some substantial extent are made in or from the state." Id.
Residence, domicile or participants, and place of issuer's organization are usually immaterial to
the operations of state securities law. Id.
196. See supra note 195 and infra note 197.
197. See Hersch & Kearney, supra note 163, at 440.
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Opponents to state takeover legislation, however, argue that states
are just hiding the same old protectionist legislation in their corporate
codes to avoid MITE's wrath.
If the Supreme Court affirmed the Seventh Circuit's decision on
commerce clause grounds, states could not use the internal affairs
doctrine to support the statutes. In addition, any state legislation
regulating the nationwide market for corporate control would violate
the commerce clause. The practical effect would be a de facto preemption of the states' ability to regulate tender offers. This is contrary
to Justices Powell's and Stevens' concurring opinions in MITE which
reject foreclosing states from regulating tender offers. 1' Such de facto
preemption would also be contrary to congressional intent as evidenced
by Congress' refusal to amend the Williams Act to prohibit state
takeover regulation. 199
State tender offer legislation, however, burdens interstate commerce by discouraging tender offers. 200 Tender offers will likely be
discouraged by the costly and uncertain success of takeovers instituted
in states with takeover statutes. 20 , The MITE court found that an
important function of tender offers is the reallocation of economic
resources to their highest valued use, a process which can improve
efficiency and competition. 2°2 An argument exists, however, that control share acquisition statutes aid the hostile bidder more than target
management. 203 The Supreme Court in CTS treats the shareholder
vote as a deterrent to tender offers. But defensive planners generally
choose tactics that preclude shareholders from the opportunity to accept the hostile offer, rather than granting shareholders the right to
accept the offer. 2°4 Control share acquisition statutes give acquirers

198. MITE, 457 U.S., 646 (Powell, J., concurring).
199. Some groups recommended that federal preemption was indicated by the Williams Act
because uniformity in tender offer legislation was needed and because state laws were too
favorable to management. See, e.g., State Takeover Statutes and the Williams Act, 32 Bus.
LAW. 187, 193 (1976). However, the Act was designed to enhance shareholder protection without
unduly intruding into state corporate law. See supra note 115.
200. See Comment, Beyond CTS: A Limited Defense of State Tender Offer Disclosure
Requiremewnts, 54 U. CH. L. REV. 657, 676 (1987).
201. Id.
202. MITE, 457 U.S. at 643.
203. See R. GILSON, supra note 181, at 193. See also Romano, The PoliticalEconomy of
Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REV. 111, 169 (1987) (concluding that shareholders might tender
more frequently under a control share acquisition statute than a fair price provision and that
acquirers would prefer an Indiana type statute to either a fair price statute or a right in
redemption statute).
204. See R. GILSON, supra note 181, at 195.
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what they want, shareholders' rights to decide whether to accept a
premium for their shares. 205 Directors must thus be able to preclude
shareholder decisions for an anti-takeover statute to be truly effective.ne
Most economists agree that target shareholders benefit from tender
offers.2 0 Even where resistance to tender offers benefit the target's
shareholders, the offeror's shareholders lose to the same extent that
the target's shareholders benefit. 208 The MITE plurality noted that
restrictive state laws will stifle the entire interstate market for corporate control.209 Incumbent management is able to retain its position
without monitoring its efficiency of performance. 210 The Court in CTS
provided only a cursory explanation of the economic ramifications of
state takeover legislation. The Court instead focused on states' interest
in regulating the voting rights of shares in-state created corporations
and found that such interest outweighed any possible benefits to interstate commerce.
Florida's takeover statutes go even further than the Indiana statute
and apply to some companies not incorporated in Florida. 211 Florida's
law applies to any company with substantial Florida based assets that
has one hundred or more shareholders, and either ten percent of its
shareholders or one thousand shareholders residing in Florida, or ten
percent of its shareholders are Florida residents. 21 This provision is
constitutionally suspect. The CTS Court explicitly held that Indiana
had no interest in protecting nonresident shareholders of nonresident
corporations. 23 The court also found that state takeover statutes do
not unconstitutionally burden interstate commerce so long as each
21 4
state regulates voting rights only in the corporations it has created.
Florida's statutes exceed the Court's stated limitations because
they apply both to domestic corporations and foreign corporations.
The provision is therefore constitutionally unsound. Florida's statute
does, however, contain a severability clause 2 5 which provides that an

205. Id. at 196.
206. Id. at 200.
207. See Bradley, Desai, & Kim, The Rationale Behind InterFirmTender Offers: Informnation or Synergy?, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 183 (1983) (empirical work on tender offers).
208. See Comment, supra note 200, at 676.
209. MITE, 457 U.S. at 642.
210. See id. at 643.
211. See supra notes 144-46 and accompanying text.
212. FLA. STAT. § 607.110(1) (1987).
213. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 107 S. Ct. 1637, 1651 (1987).
214. Id. at 1649.
215. Florida H.R. 358, § C (Reg. Sess. 1987, introduced by Rep. Jennings).
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unconstitutional portion of a statute can be excised, leaving the remainder unaffected. 216 If challenged Florida's takeover statutes will likely

be found constitutional, but with the provision applying to foreign
corporations excised.
2.

Supremacy Clause Analysis

The CTS Court did not reject the MITE plurality's preemption
argument. Rather, the Court argued that the Illinois statute in MITE
favored management over offerors, to the shareholders' detriment.217
In contrast, the Indiana statute in CTS protected independent
shareholders against both of the contending parties. 2 8 Thus, the Indiana Act furthered the basic purpose of the Williams Act by placing
investors on an equal footing with the takeover bidder. 21 9 The CTS
Court reasoned that the Indiana control share acquisition statute allowed shareholders to vote as a group, which protected them from
the coercive aspects of some tender offers.2 0
The Court in CTS criticized the Seventh Circuit's preemption
analysis as illusory.2l The Seventh Circuit argued that the statute
conflicts with the shorter twenty business day period established by
the SEC as the minimum period for which a tender offer may be held
open.- The Supreme Court rejected these arguments and determined
that the Indiana Act does not impose an absolute fifty day delay on
tender offers, or preclude an offeror from purchasing shares as soon
as federal law permits.m The offeror can also make a conditional offer
to accept shares on the condition that its shares contain voting rights.'
The majority asserted that the MITE plurality only held that the
2
offeror should be free to go forward without unreasonable delay.
The Indiana statute in CTS provided that if full voting rights will be
vested, they will be vested within fifty days after the offer's commencement. This period is within the sixty day maximum period Congress

216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
in CTS,
223.
224.
225.

Id.
CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1645.
Id.
Id. at 1645-46.
Id. at 1646.
Id. at 1647.
Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 261 (7th Cir. 1986) (discussed
107 S. Ct. at 1647).
CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1647.
Id.
Id. (citing Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 639 (1982)).-
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established for tender offers.226 Because the delay was within the congressionally determined period, it was not unreasonable. The Court
in CTS limited the Williams Act's preemptive power to cases in which
management was given an advantage in controlling the requirements
of tender offers, or when the delay required by the state regulation
was so long as to make a successful legal tender offer impossible.
The Court finally noted that the Williams Act would preempt a
variety of valid state corporate laws if it were construed to preempt
any state statute that limits or delays the free exercise of power after
a successful tender offer.m The possibility that the Indiana statute
would delay some tender offers is insufficient to support a finding that
the Williams Act preempted the Indiana statute.2 The Court reasoned
that if Congress had intended to preempt all state laws that delay
the acquisition of voting control following a tender offer, it would have
explicitly expressed that intention.m
Justice White, in his dissent, argued that the Indiana statute frustrated the purpose of the Williams Act. The dissent attacked the
majority for equating the protection of individual investors, the focus
of the Williams Act, with the protection of shareholders as a group. 1
Because the Indiana statute will frequently prevent an individual investor from selling stock at a premium, the statute frustrates individual investment decisions. Thus, the dissent reasoned that the Indiana scheme conflicted with the Williams Act's careful balancing to
protect individual investors and permit them to decide whether to sell
22
their stock.

The dissent also distinguished the control share acquisition statute
from other state corporate law. The Indiana statute was designed to
prevent certain tender offers from taking place. It was transactional
in nature, although it was characterized by Indiana as involving only
the voting rights of certain shares.m The dissent argued that the
Indiana Act prevents minority shareholders in some circumstances
from selling their stock to a willing tender offeror. This result conflicts
with the purpose of the Williams Act.23

226.

15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1982).

227.
228.

CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1647.
Id.

229.

Id. at 1648.

230. Id.
231.

Id. at 1654 (White, J., dissenting).

232. Id.
233.

Id. at 1655.

234. Id.
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Congress did not intend for the federal government to be the only
regulating body in the securities field. The Securities and Exchange
Act of 1934 states that nothing in the Act shall affect the jurisdiction
of any state's securities commission if such jurisdiction does not conflict
with the Act's provisions or the regulations promulgated under the
Act.2 Thus, state takeover statutes are not preempted when a com6
pany may comply with both federal and state law.23
The Williams Act's requirement that tender offers stay open a
minimum of twenty days differs from most minimum open day requirements in state statutes. However, simultaneous compliance is possible.
Offerors may comply with the longer of the two minimum periods and
thus satisfy the requirements of both.2
State regulation may not interfere with the purpose of federal
legislation. The Williams Act's purpose is to allow investors to make
informal decisions without favoring either the acquiring company or
target management.m In 1979, a release indicated that the SEC was
considering a thirty day minimum open period.239 The Commission
later disclosed that the thirty day period was unnecessarily long.-O
This would tend to support the Seventh Circuit's rationale that extra
delay favors target management, and provides a "lethal dose" to most
tender offers. 1' The CTS majority, however, interpreted MITE as
holding that an offeror should be free to make a tender offer without
unreasonable delay. The possible fifty day delay caused by most control
share acquisition statutes is ten days less than the maximum time for
a tender offer under the Williams Act.w Thus, a delay of over twenty
days is reasonable and consistent with congressional intent.M
Perhaps state takeover statutes' greatest weakness under the
supremacy clause is that they often do not regulate evenhandedly.
Most state statutes provide exemptions for self-tenders.2 Some state
statutes exempt "friendly" tender offers approved by the target

235. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78bb(a) (1986); see also Comment, supra note 200, at 671.
236. See Comment, supra note 200, at 671.
237. Id.
2:38. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
239. Unlawful Tender Offer Practices, Exchange Act Release No. 33-6022, [1979 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 81,935, at 81,236 (Feb. 5, 1979).
240. Unlawful Tender Offer Practices, Exchange Act Release No. 33-6158, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,373, at 82,595 (Nov. 29, 1979).
241. See Comment, supra note 200, at 672.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 607.108(5) (1987).
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board.25 These statutes are constitutionally suspect because they effectively favor target company management, which is contrary to the
neutrality principles espoused in the Williams Act.
FairPrice Statutes - A Post CTS Analysis
No court has yet ruled on the constitutionality of the fair price
C.

statutes.2 6 The statutes' future, however, seems secure because of

the CTS decision.
1. Commerce Clause Analysis
Fair price statutes do not interfere with a bidder's acquisition of
shares, but through internal affairs regulation restrict what can be
done with shares once they are acquired.? 7 By concentrating on the
second step of the takeover process, fair price statutes do not appear
to directly burden interstate commerce.m Nevertheless, fair price statutes may indirectly burden interstate commerce. 9 The CTS decision
indicates that a state may define shareholders' voting rights so long
as the laws do not discriminate against out-of-state shareholders. Thus,
fair price statutes appear constitutionally sound.
Fair price statutes, however, may discourage nationwide tender
offers.2 ° Potential bidders may be uncertain of their chances of successfully completing the second step of a two-step offer.' 1 Fair price statutes also make financing uncertain because a lender never knows how
much it will cost to complete the second step. 2 Fair price statutes
apply to all owners, including out-of-state owners.2 Theoretically, the
statutes can regulate a tender offer even when all shareholders are
shareholdnon-residents. The local interest in protecting resident
5
ers may be weak compared to interstate interests.2 '

245. Id.
246. Dart Group, Inc. attacked the Maryland statute's constitutionality in the initial step
of its tender offer for the stock of Safeway Stores but the litigation became moot when a friendly
takeover was negotiated. Dart Group Corp. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., No. HAR 86-2187 (D. Md.
filed July 19, 1986) (cited in Hanks, supra note 156, at 36 n.41).
247. Sargent, Do the Second-Generation State Takeover Statutes Violate the Commerce
Clause?, 8 CORP. L. REv. 3, 11 (1985).
248. Hersch & Kearney, supra note 163, at 447.
249. Id.
250. Bolotti & Pospisil, Developments in State Takeover Statutes, in 1 HOSTILE BATTLES
FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 439, 453 (1986).
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Hanks, supra note 156, at 34.
254. Id. at 35, col. 1.
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Under fair price statutes, shareholders in one vote, and disinterested shareholders in another vote decide the fate of the tender
offer.5' Shareholders generally may regulate corporate internal affairs.2 Fair price statutes arguably regulate only internal corporate
affairs,26 which is within the states' scope of authority.2 However,
Judge Posner in Dynamics v. CTS pointed out that state statutes
affecting internal affairs are not immune from commerce clause review.2 9 Courts will balance the benefits and burdens according to the
Pike test.2 ° Because states have such a high interest in defining voting
rights of shareholders in in-state corporations, fair price statutes will
likely survive commerce clause attacks.
2. Supremacy Clause Analysis
The Williams Act does not conflict directly with fair price statutes.
Both purport to protect shareholders. However, the purpose of the
Williams Act is to increase the amount of information available to
shareholders so they may determine for themselves whether to tender
their shares. 2 1 This purpose is different from the purpose of the fair
price statutes which are intended to promote parity among shareholders. 262 Parity is virtually impossible to achieve. Therefore, the real

purpose and actual effect of fair price statutes may be to discourage
takeovers.3
Fair price statutes effectively provide target management with
defensive advantages. The supermajority votes are difficult to
achieve. 264 Superappraisal rights are an additional incentive to vote
against the transaction because dissenting voters sell their stock ac-

255. E.g., MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. §§ 3-602(1), (2) (1985).
256. See supra notes 115, 194-95 and accompanying text.
257. Hersch & Kearney, supra note 163, at 447.
258. Id.
259. Dynamics, 794 F.2d 250, 264 (7th Cir. 1986). See Hersch & Kearney, supranote 163,
at 447.
260. See supra 168-70 and accompanying text.
261. H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprintedin 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2811, 2813-14. See Hanks, supra note 156, at 34.
262. Hanks, supra note 156, at 34.
263. Id. If fair price statutes' purpose is to promote price parity among shareholders rather
than to protect state interests of keeping corporations in state, then it is awkward that none
of the statutes contains an exception for freeze-out transactions following an "any-or-all" tender
offer. In an any-or-all tender offer, all shareholders have the same opportunity to sell their
shares at the same price. Id. at 36 n.45.
264. No bidder has ever satisfied these requirements in any contested takeover of a corporation in a fair price state. Id. at 34.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1988

29

Florida Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 1 [1988], Art. 6
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40

cording to a fair price formula, rather than the lower fair market
value.265 States with fair price multipliers further discourage takeovers.
Because a target's stock price typically rises during a tender offer,
the "fair price" paid in states with the multiplier will almost always
2
be above the price paid to any shareholder during the tender offer. 6
Fair price statutes also usually prohibit a bidder from acquiring
additional shares of target stock after becoming an interested shareholder.m This leaves the bidder with the choice of mounting its tender
offer from a weak position of low stock ownership, obtaining supermajority approval, or foregoing one hundred percent ownership.m The
inhibiting impact of fair price statutes arises out of practical impossibility and high transactional costs rather than outright prohibition.2 9
Fair price statutes also contain provisions that waive the supermajority
votes if the board of directors of the target company approve a transaction prior to the time the acquiring company becomes interested.2 0
These provisions favor the target company's management and violate
the Williams Act policy of neutrality.
Although fair price statutes favor the target company's management, they allow only shareholders of the target company to ultimately
interfere with the tender offer.?1 This conforms with the shareholder
protection policy of the Williams Act and the rationale of the CTS
decision. Fair price statutes also operate in an area of traditional state
concern, the internal regulation of corporations. If fair price statutes
violate the supremacy clause, many traditionally valid state corporate
regulations may also become unconstitutional. Thus, fair price statutes
are on a constitutionally firm ground.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's decision in CTS indicates a reversal of the
Court's view of state takeover legislation. Although the Court only
determined the fate of the Indiana control share acquisition statute,
its decision affects other second generation state takeover statutes.
The Supreme Court's decision effectively breathes new life into these
state takeover statutes.

265.
266.
267.
268.
269.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

270.

See, e.g., M.D. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 3-603(c)(1) (1985).

271.

Shareholders are the only participants in the supermajority votes. See supranote 255.
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While the statutes impose some burden on interstate commerce,
the local interests in protecting resident shareholders outweigh the
burdens. If states regulate using the internal affairs doctrine, the
statutes will probably be upheld. States can use their authority to
regulate domestic corporations, and to define the voting rights of
shareholders without violating the commerce clause. This conclusion
is in line with Justices Powell's and Stevens' concurring opinion in
MITE and with expressed congressional intent. 272
The CTS Court's supremacy clause reasoning also ensures the
states' ability to regulate takeovers. Most state takeover statutes delay
tender offers. Delays in tender offers, even those contemplated by
the Williams Act, inherently favor target company management by
affording more time to defend. Under the CTS Court's reasoning,
state takeover statutes are constitutional despite such delays. As long
as a company can comply with both the Williams Act and the state
statutes, the purposes of the Williams Act will not be frustrated. By
protecting independent shareholders against both the acquiring company and target management, the state scheme furthers the federal
policy of investor protection.- However, as the CTS dissent points
out, state statutes may prevent individual shareholders from selling
stock at a premium, which frustrates the federal policy of individual
investor protection.-74
Florida's takeover statutes will thus likely survive constitutional
scrutiny. Like Indiana's control share acquisition statute, Florida's
control share acquisition statute protects shareholders from the contending parties. It is also possible to comply with both the Williams
Act and the Florida statute.
Florida's fair price statute will also likely survive a constitutional
attack. The statute regulates corporate internal affairs, which are
within the states' scope of authority. The fair price statute has some
inhibiting impact on interstate commerce and also effectively favors
management. However, the states' authority to regulate corporations
they create justifies such burdens.7 Because of these burdens, the
portion of Florida's statute applying the statutes to certain foreign
corporations will likely be found unconstitutional and severed. While
Florida has a significant interest in governing corporations it creates,

272. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 626-27 (1982); see also supra notes 115,
194-96 and accompanying text.
273. Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp, 107 S. Ct. 1637, 1645 (1987).

274.

Id. at 1654 (White, J., dissenting).

275.

Id. at 1649.
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the interest becomes much more attenuated when applied to foreign
corporations.
While most state takeover legislation is constitutional under the
CTS decision, the legislation is often passed for the wrong reasons.
Shareholder protection should be the main objective of these statutes.
However, as evidenced by the legislative history of the Florida statute,
takeover statutes are often passed to keep domestic corporations instate, and to protect incumbent management.- 6 In fact, many of the
new statutes were hurriedly passed to thwart looming takeovers.
Shareholders should be protected, however, they should be protected
for the right reasons, using the means least restrictive to a national
economy.
Mark S. Meland

276.

See supra note 126.
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